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Ever since its inception EMU has been subject to controversy. The fiscal policy rules embedded 
in the Treaty on European Union, and clarified in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), are 
probably the most contentious. The SGP as always being accused of being too rigid and of 
forcing procyclicality in fiscal policy. However, in an influential paper Galí and Perotti (2003) 
concluded that discretionary fiscal policy has actually become more countercyclical in EMU 
countries after the Maastricht Treaty. This paper concludes that this conclusion resists to several 
robustness tests using ex-post data, including the use of institutional variables, but not to the use 
of real-time data. Using ex-post data there is some evidence pointing to a more countercyclical 
use of discretionary fiscal policy (or at least to a decrease in the use of procyclical discretionary 
fiscal  policy).  However,  the  use  of  real-time  data  for  the  period  1999-2006  reveals  that 
discretionary  fiscal  policy  has  been  designed  to  be  procyclical.  Hence,  the  actual  acyclical 
behaviour of discretionary fiscal policy in the period after 1999 seems to be simply the result of 
errors in the forecast of the output gap, and not the result of a change in the intentions of policy 
makers. As a result, there is no evidence in favour of the view that Maastricht rules have forced 
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The completion of EMU in Europe, with the introduction of the single currency – the 
euro- in 1999 has greatly affected the conduct of economic policy in the twelve participating 
member states. The only traditional short-term macroeconomic instrument that remains in the 
control of national authorities is fiscal policy. Consequently, fiscal policy has gained new 
responsibilities  with  EMU,  but  at  the  same  time  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  (SGP) 
constrains  it  operation.  Fiscal  policy  must  now  provide  output  smoothing,  especially  the 
smoothing  of  asymmetric  shocks,  and  contribute  to  attaining  price  stability  and  external 
balance. These new objectives are particularly important for the case of small countries out of 
synchrony with the rest of the monetary union and require a flexible fiscal policy. This paper 
therefore aims at evaluating the actual cyclical properties of discretionary fiscal policy. 
 
It has been argued that the fiscal rules imposed by the SGP would lead to the need to 
override the working of the automatic fiscal stabilisers, resulting in a procyclical discretionary 
fiscal policy. However, in an influential paper Galí and Perotti (2003) argued the opposite was 
true: discretionary fiscal policy in EMU countries had become in fact more countercyclical 
after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, following the trend of other industrialized 
countries. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature assessing the robustness of such finding in a 
number of different ways. Firstly, it will use a different dataset for all the 15 EU countries, 
but Luxembourg. Galí and Perotti (2003) have used OECD data, while here the main source 
of data is the AMECO database from the European Commission (version of autumn 2006). 
Secondly, it will also test for a different sub-period division. The authors have distinguished 
the before and after 1992 period. This paper breaks the after-1992 period into more detail. 
Thirdly, it is also tested the impact of an extension of the estimation period to 2006, i.e. 
including three more years of EMU. Fourthly, this paper tests the validity of the authors’ 
conclusions to the inclusion of controls for the effects of political-institutional variables on 
the cyclically adjusted primary deficit. Fifthly, and lastly, this paper tests the validity of the 
previous conclusions to the use of real-time data for the period 1999-2006.  
 
The structure of the paper is as  follows.  Section II reviews the economics of fiscal 
policy in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It briefly reviews the role of fiscal policy in 
the  EMU  setup.  Section  III  presents  the  methodology  and  data  used  in  the  empirical 
application.  Section  IV  presents  the  empirical  results.  The  conclusions  are  discussed  in 
Section V. 
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II.   Fiscal Policy in EMU 
In a traditional Keynesian framework different short-term objectives are achieved by 
making use of different instruments: fiscal policy is responsible for the stabilisation of the 
business  cycle;  monetary  policy  tries  to  maintain  price  stability  and  might  also  help  to 
stabilise the business cycle; and the exchange rate policy helps to stabilise external balance. 
Since the last two instruments have been lost in euro-area countries, fiscal policy obligations 
have increased. For euro-area countries, fiscal policy has to achieve three objectives: a) the 
stabilisation of the business cycle, especially the stabilisation of asymmetric demand shocks; 
b) help to stabilise inflation, especially in small countries when out of synchrony with the rest 
of the monetary union; and, c) the attainment of external balance. 
 
Compared with the pre-EMU situation, fiscal policy now plays an extended role in the 
smoothing  of  output  shocks,  particularly  idiosyncratic  demand  shocks.    Even  if  the  ECB 
pursues some degree of output smoothing, the single monetary policy could not be used to 
smooth asymmetric shocks.
1 Consequently, most of the short-term stabilisation effort relies 
on fiscal policy. Moreover, comparing the euro -area with other  successful currency unions, 
namely, with the USA, we can say that fiscal policy is particularly relevant for the smoothing 
of shocks in the euro-area as this latter currency area lacks most of the usual responses to 
asymmetric shocks, that is, labour mobility within the area, flexibility of wages and prices, 
and finally some sort of insurance mechanism, like an automatic mechanism for transferring 
fiscal resources to the affected country(ies)/region(s). Marinheiro (2005) concludes for the 
decisive contribution of the government sector to the smoothing of output shocks in the euro 
area, particularly in smoothing more persistent shocks to output. 
 
Negative demand shocks cause a fall in both the output gap and inflation. When there is 
a symmetric demand shock which affects the entire euro-area, both the centralised monetary 
policy  and  the  automatic  fiscal  stabilisers  could  be  used  to  smooth  it  out.  However,  the 
common monetary policy cannot be used to smooth out asymmetric shocks. The monetary 
policy only reacts when there is a change in the euro-area inflation and output gap. If the 
shock only affects (a small) part of the area, the aggregate statistics do not change (much), 
and so the ECB does not react. This is particularly true for the case of the small countries of 
the euro-area. For example, a 1% fall in the German GDP has a much larger impact in the 
euro-area aggregate than a 1% drop in the Portuguese GDP. Thus when small country is out 
of synchrony with the rest of the monetary union it suffers from the perverse effects of the 
single monetary policy: its inflation rate and output gap decline, but as the aggregate euro-
area figures do not change, the ECB does not adjust its monetary policy. As a result, a small 
country affected by a negative asymmetric demand shock faces an interest rate that is higher 
                                                 
1 Under Article 2 of the ECB Statutes, “without prejudice to the objective of price stability” the ECB supports 
the general economic objectives of the European Community, namely the goal of a high level of employment. So 
only if it does not endanger the primary objective of price stability could the ECB pursue the stabilisation of the 
euro-area output gap.    4 
than it would be if it were a country large enough to influence the monetary union average.
2 
Such shocks must therefore be smoothed by the operation of fiscal policy, and by an increase 
in net exports. Fiscal policy is therefore more important than before, when there were national 
monetary policies, particularly for small countries. 
 
III.    Methodology and data 
The study will be based on a panel data estimation for all the 15 European countries, 
except  Luxembourg.  The  source  of  data  is  the  November  2006  version  of  the  AMECO 
database of the European Commission, complemented with OECD Economic Outlook data 
for some years.
3 Since the purpose of the paper is to test for the robustness of the specification 
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Where dt* is the cyclically adjusted primary deficit, Et-1.xt is the expected output gap, 
and bt-1 is debt outstanding at the time of the budget decision (all variables are expressed a 
share of potential GDP).
4 The inclusion of the lagged debt ratio allows to control for sustainability 
considerations in the conduct of fiscal policy. 
 
If fiscal policy were being used as a pure countercyclical instrument to dampen the 
amplitude of the business cycle, that is if the automatic stabilisers are allowed to work freely 
over the cycle, we should observe an increase in the budget deficit during recessions and an 
improvement during upturns. This implies a negative reaction of the budget deficit to the 
output gap. Since, the interest is on the behaviour of discretionary fiscal policy, cyclically 
adjusted data is being use. The use of the cyclically adjusted primary deficit as a proxy for 
discretionary actions is already standard in the literature, although in practice there are several 
difficulties in disentangling the automatic fiscal policy variations from discretionary actions.
 5 
 
                                                 
2  This  non-responsiveness  of  the  interest  rate  increases  the  real  burden  of  public  debt  for  highly  indebted 
countries. 
3 In order to reach a balanced panel, some AMECO missing values were carefully linked with observations from 
the OCDE database. Some cyclically adjusted fiscal data is only available for some countries several years after 
1980 in the AMECO database. It is the case of Greece (1988), Ireland (1995), Spain (1995), and Sweden (1993). 
Data on the unadjusted balances, and the (calculated) implied sensitivity to the cycle was taken from the OECD 
database. Using it together with the output gap from AMECO resulted into linked series. The OEC D EO 
database is also the source of the US output gap estimate. 
4 Potential output is used as a deflator of all variables, instead of actual output, to reduce endogeneity problems 
and to minimize the influence of current GDP on the evolution of the fiscal  ratios. See Bayoumi and Masson 
(1995) for a similar use. The output gap is  defined as the difference between current and potential output as a 
fraction of potential output. 
5 The use of primary balance instead of the overall budget balance is motivated by the fact that interest payments 
are not under the control of the fiscal authorities, but simply reflect the evolution of the interest rate and the past 
accumulation of budget deficits. See also Brandner, Diebalek et al. (2006) for an application of an unobserved 
components model to estimate a core balance for Austria.   5 
The  expected  output  gap  was  proxied  by  Galí  and  Perotti  (2003)  making  use  of 
instrumental variable estimation. More precisely, for EU countries the output gap variable is 
instrumented by the lagged output and by the lagged US output. An interesting alternative 
would be the use of “real-time data” as in Forni and Momigliano (2004). However, such data 
is only available from 1993 onwards, invalidating its use in comparisons between the pre-euro 
and post-euro period. 
 
There are also other interesting specifications in the literature to test for the cyclical properties 
of fiscal policy. Just see Wyplosz (2002),  Auerbach (2002), Lane (2003), and Pina (2004). However, 
since the purpose is to test for the robustness of the conclusions of Galí and Perotti (2003), it makes 
sense to use their own specification to get directly comparable results. 
 
However, since the seminal contribution of Roubini and Sachs (1989), an increasing 
amount of literature has signalled the importance of the institutional design of national budget 
institutions  to  the  amount  of  the  budget  deficits.  Just  see,  Brender  and  Drazen  (2005), 
Volkerink and de Haan (2001), Mierau, Jong-A-Pin et al. (2006), Woo (2003), among others. 
Hence, the omission of such important variables might bias the previous results. As a result 
this paper incorporates some of such political-institutional variables into the reaction function 
proposed by Galí and Perotti (2003) to test for the robustness of the authors’ conclusions. The 
data source of such variables is Mierau et al. (2006).  
 
IV.   Empirical evidence on the effective cyclical properties of fiscal 
policy  
The importance of fiscal policy as a countercyclical stabilisation means that it makes 
sense to see whether fiscal policy has in fact been used in Europe with such considerations in 
mind.  Some  feared  EMU  rules  might  force  an  overridden  of  automatic  stabilizers  by  a 
procyclical  use  of  discretionary  fiscal  policy.
6  Galí  and  Perotti  (2003)   concluded  that 
Maastricht  rules  have  signalled  a  shift  of  discretionary  fiscal  policy  towards  a  more 
countercyclical  instrument.  This  section  will  empirically  test  the  robustness  of  this 
conclusion. 
A.  The impact of the euro 
Table  1  presents  the  results  of  a  panel  estimation  for  EU-15  countries  and  euro-area 
countries  (except  Luxembourg)  for  the  cyclically  adjusted  primary  deficit.  Results  are 
obtained allowing for different intercepts for each country using an instrumental variable (IV) 
fixed effects (LSDV) estimator. When using fixed effects, the inference is conditional on the 
particular set of countries and for the specific time periods observed.
7 This is precisely our 
objective. Another possibility would be to estimate the model using random effects. This 
would avoid the loss of degrees of freedom implied by the use of fixed effects, and the 
                                                 
6 For a discussion about the usefulness and desirability of discretionary fiscal policy, see the excellent surveys by 
Andersen (2001) and Auerbach (2002). 
7 See Baltagi (2001).   6 
inference would pertain to the large population from which the sample is drawn. However, 
this technique is only appropriate if we are drawing the N individuals randomly from a large 
population. Thus, it is necessary to have a panel representative of the whole population for 
which we are trying to make inferences. As our population includes all the EU-15 countries, 
except Luxembourg, it makes no econometric sense to use a random effects estimator.  In 
short, and in this case, econometric theory clearly points to the use of the fixed effects model.
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In order to replicate the results of Galí and Perotti (2003), we have only slightly modified 
such author’s estimation.  Equation (1) is estimated by Galí and Perotti (2003) allowing for a 
break in 1992 in all the variables (output gap, lagged debt, and lagged deficit), plus a break in 
the country-fixed effects. However, their results do not point to a break in the lagged debt and 
lagged  deficit  variables.  Hence,  in  order  to  reduce  the  number  of  regressors,  we  have 
differently only allowed a break to occur only for the gap variable. In common with Galí and 
Perotti (2003), we have used the instruments lagged output gap, and lagged US output gap to 
instrument for the expected output gap. 
 
Table 1 presents the empirical results of estimating equation (1) for a balanced panel of 
the  12  euro  area  countries,  and  for  the  15  EU  member  countries,  except  Luxembourg, 
allowing for different breaks in the output gap variable.  As mentioned before, the dependent 
variable is the cyclically adjusted primary deficit (as a percentage of potential GDP). Being 
this variable, by definition, immune to cyclical developments, and not influenced by the past 
debt accumulation, its evolution over time is an indicator of discretionary fiscal policy. A 
positive  coefficient  for  the  output  gap  variable  can  be  interpreted  as  a  procyclical 
discretionary fiscal policy. 
 
Column (1) of Table 1 presents the panel estimates for EMU obtained in the panel 
estimate of Galí and Perotti (2003: 550) for the period 1980-2003, showing evidence for an 
increase in the degree of countercyclicality of discretionary fiscal policy after the signing of 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Such policy was, according to their results, procyclical before 
1992, and becomes acyclical after Maastricht. Moreover, the different between such two sub-
periods is statistically significant. 
 
Column (2) tries to replicate such results for the same period, but for the 12 euro-area 
economies (except Luxembourg), using a different dataset.
9 The results are very similar to 
those of Galí and Perotti (2003) shown in column (1). Discretionary fiscal policy is found to 
                                                 
8 There is however a technical caveat regarding the use of fixed effects with a lagged endogenous variable 
resulting into inconsistent estimators. The alternative would be the use the estimator proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). However, the small-sample properties of such estimator are not well understood. Moreover, as 
much of the focus is on the difference between the estimates of the gap coefficient between two periods, we 
have, as Galí and Perotti (2003: note 6) did, opted to present the results with a standard instrumental variables 
fixed effects estimator. 
9 Galí and Perotti (2003) used OECD data, here the main source of data is the AMECO database, from the 
European Commission.   7 
be  procyclical  before  1992,  and  acyclical  after  1992.  The  difference  between  the  gap 
coefficients for the two sub-periods is also statistically significant. 
 
Although the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992, it envisaged three stages until the 
adoption of a common currency, the date for the start of stage III was not initially defined. 
The Treaty stated only that if, “by the end of 1997, the date for the beginning of the third 
stage has not been set, the third stage shall start on 1 January 1999”. It was only in December 
1995 that the European Council confirmed that stage three of EMU would start on 1 January 
1999.  In order a country to qualify to membership of the euro, it was required to achieve a 
budget deficit below the reference value of 3% of GDP before the start of stage three. Hence, 
it might make sense to subdivide the post-Maastricht period (1992-2003) into three different 
sub-periods: 1992-1995; 1996-1998; and, finally 1999-2003. The first of such sub-periods 
starts immediately after the signing of the Treaty, but before the decision of the start of EMU 
is taken. Hence, the consolidation efforts towards the 3% have been relatively modest.
10 The 
1996-1998 period is the run-up period to the single currency. The start of the third stage, was 
already set to 1999, and member-countries did in fact made intensive consolidation efforts in 
this period, since the time to qualify to the membership of the monetary union was rapidly 
running out. Finally, the last sub-period, 1999-2003, is the period after the introduction of the 
euro. The 3% rule keep binding, under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) dispositions, but 
there is no provision for a country that does not keeps it deficit under the 3% ceiling to be 
expelled from euro-area. Hence, the actual start of the single currency might have induced a 
different fiscal policy behaviour from the qualifying stage. 
 
Column  (3)  shows  the  empirical  results  when  the  sub -period  after  Maastricht  is 
subdivided into the mentioned three sub -periods.  The result for the pre -Maastricht period 
stays unaffected by the sub-division: discretionary fiscal policy is found to be procyclical in 
this sub-period. Yet, there is considerable variation in the post -1992 sub-period. The period 
immediately after the signing of the Treaty (1992 -1995) is characterized by countercyclical 
discretionary  fiscal  policy  (at  the  10%  significance  level).  However,  the  run -up  to 
qualification for EMU (1996 -1998) is characterized by a strong procyclical discretionary 
fiscal  policy  stance.  The  post -euro  period (1999-2003)  is  characterized  by  an  acyclical 
discretionary fiscal policy. 
 
Next, the period under analysis was extend until 2006 (in the previous results it ended in 
2003 as in  Galí and Perotti (2003)). The previous conclusions are robust to the addition of 
three more years to the euro sub-period. The results are in columns (4) and (5). Column (4) 
presents the results for the Galí -Perotti’s subdivision of time (before and after Maastricht), 
while column (5) presents the results when disaggregating more the after-Maastricht period. 
 
                                                 
10 Stage II of EMU started only in 1994, and it was clear to participants that phase III would only start on the 
date limit imposed by Article 121 of the Treaty (1999).   8 
It was also tested a different sub-division of time, considering the sub-period before and 
after the introduction of the euro. The results (not reported) were not substantially different 
from the reported ones: before the introduction of the euro discretionary fiscal policy is found 
to be procyclical, and becomes acyclical with the introduction of the euro. 
 
Columns (6)-(9) extend the number of countries considered to encompass all EU-15 
member countries, with the exception of Luxembourg. The results obtained are very similar to 
the obtained for the euro area. Discretionary fiscal policy presented procyclical behaviour in 
the pre-Maastricht period and is mostly acyclical after 1992. Further subdivision of the after 
Maastricht period yields same conclusions as before. Immediately after 1992, discretionary 
fiscal  policy presents  a  countercyclical  behaviour, which is  reversed in  the run-up to  the 
single currency (1996-1998). After the introduction of the euro, discretionary fiscal policy has 
not reacted to the business cycle fluctuations.  
 
With regard to the other controls included in the regression, both the lagged debt and the 
lagged deficit are statistically significant. The estimated debt coefficient is negative, ranging 
from -0.025 to -0.036, meaning that the average country reduced the structural primary deficit 
by approximately 0.03 of potential GDP for each additional point of debt in the previous year. 
This value, although small means that sustainability considerations enter into discretionary 
fiscal policy decisions.  Table 1- Determinants of Cyclically Adjusted Primary Deficit (%Potential GDP)-1980-2003 & 1980-2006 
  Euro Area    EU-15 
  (1)*  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)    (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 






















-  -  -    -0.038 
(-0.66) 
-  -  - 
GAP92-95  -  -  -0.147 
(-1.73) 
-  -0.092 
(-1.15) 
  -  -0.134 
(-1.76) 
-  -0.133 
(-1.8) 
GAP96-98  -  -  0.407 
(2.09) 
-  0.431 
(2.61) 
  -  0.494 
(2.98) 
-  0.513 
(3.19) 
GAP99-2003  -  -  0.005 
(0.05) 
-  -    -  -0.038 
(-0.36) 
-  - 
GAP99-2006  -  -  -  -  0.046 
(0.53) 
  -  -  -  0.035 
(0.4) 
GAP92-2006  -  -  -  0.018 
(0.06) 
-    -  -  -0.005 
(-0.09) 
- 






































P-value BM-AM  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.0)  (0.09)  (0.009)    (0.052)  (0.0)  (0.181)  (0.0) 
P-value BM-A€  -  -  (0.138)  -  (0.054)    -  (0.527)  -  (0.211) 
















































Notes: In parentheses T-stats for coefficients and p-values for tests. The estimation method is Least Squared Dummy Variables (LSDV). The main source of data is the 
AMECO database, Autumn 2006 version, complemented with data from the OECD Economic Outlook database (Nov. 2006). PCGIVE based calculations including a 
constant term (omitted). The  AR1 test is asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no first order serial correlation. Idem for AR2.  A  countercyclical 
discretionary fiscal policy implies a negative GAP coefficient. P-value BM-A€: p-value for the equality of coefficients before Maastricht and after the introduction of the 
euro *Column (1) presents Galí and Perotti (2003) results for EMU (Table 3). a) Since Galí and Perotti (2003) present estimates for the periods before and after Maastrich, 
due to lack of space we have just retained only the before Maastricht coefficient and T-value (the two estimates are not significantly different from each other). 
 B.  The impact of the euro and institutional variables 
In this section it is being investigated whether the previous conclusions regarding the 
cyclical  behaviour  of  discretionary  fiscal  policy  are  robust  to  controlling  for  the  impact  of 
institutional aspects. With such purpose in mind, equation (1) is augmented with the inclusion of 
political-institutional variables. In the practical estimation, proxies for political fragmentation in 
government or Parliament, and data on the occurrence of elections or the formation of a new 
government were used.  
 
Following Volkerink and de Haan (2001), the following variables have been considered. 
As proxies of size fragmentation: the effective number of parties in government (ENoP_G); the 
effective number of parties in parliament (ENoP_P), capturing the government’s position vis-à-
vis  parliament;  the  number  of  spending  ministers  (NSM),  i.e.  simply  the  total  number  of 
ministers in government minus the ministers of finance and/or the budget and the prime minister; 
and, seats in excess seats of collation in parliament (surplus seats). As measures of political 
fragmentation  in  government/parliament:  political  fragmentation  in  government  (Frag_G); 
political fragmentation in Parliament (Frag_P). The latter variable might be relevant because the 
more  politically  divided  parliament  is,  the  less  the  government  may  have  to  fear  from  the 
opposition. Finally, dummies for elections (Elect) and for the formation of a new government 
(NewGov) were also considered. 
 
As  expected,  there  is  a  high  degree  of  correlation  between  the  variables  regarding 
parliament and government, since the latter emanates from the former (see Table 2). There is also 
a high degree of correlation between the occurrence of elections and the formation of a new 
government. As a result, it is not advisable to include in the same regression all such variables, in 
order to avoid multicollinearity problems. Since, the purpose is to determine the orientation of 
discretionary policy, it was opted just to retain the indication of size fragmentation in government 
(number of parties in government, number of spending ministers), and the number of excess seats 
in parliament. In addition the election dummy is also included. 
 
Political  fragmentation  variables  were  not  retained  because  they  proved  to  be  not 
statistically significant. In line with the results in Volkerink and de Haan (2001), government 
ideology revealed to have no impact on cyclically adjusted primary deficit. Hence there is no 
support for the view that argues that as left-wing parties would like to spend more, they are also 
likely to have higher structural primary deficits. A possible explanation is given by in Volkerink 
and  de  Haan  (2001).  According  to  such  authors,  left-wing  governments  do  not  have  higher 
deficits than right-wing governments, because although they spend more, they also tax more, 
leaving the balance unaltered.  
   11 
Table 2- Correlation among political variables – euro-area - 1980-2003 
  ENoP_G ENoP_P  NSM  Frag_P  Frag_G  Surplus S.  NewGov  Elect 
ENoP_G  1.00  0.86  -0.13  0.42  0.63  0.30  0.08  0.01 
ENoP_P    1.00  -0.22  0.33  0.49  0.07  0.07  0.03 
NSM      1.00  0.14  -0.22  0.04  0.11  -0.05 
Frag_P        1.00  0.32  0.02  0.04  -0.02 
Frag_G          1.00  0.18  -0.01  0.01 
Surplus Seats          1.00  0.05  0.00 
NewGov              1.00  0.70 
Elect                1.00 
Source of data: Mierau et al. (2006). 
 
Table  3  presents  the  results  regarding  the  determinants  of  cyclically  adjusted  primary 
deficit when controlling for the effects of political-institutional variables for the period 1980-
2003.
1 For convenience, column (1) repeats the same regression shown previously in column (2) 
of  Table  1. With regard to the institutional variables it can be seen that elections have a 
significant positive impact on the cyclically adjusted primary deficit (CAPD), meaning that 
elections induce a discretionary fiscal expansion. The effective number of parties in government 
(ENoP_G) has a negative, but not statistically significant impact on the CAPD. The excess seats 
the government has in parliament has also a non statistically significant negative impact on the 
CAPD. On the contrary, the number of spending ministers (NSM) has a strongly positive and 
statistically significant impact in the CAPPD.   
 
An important finding is that the previous results regarding the impact of the introduction of 
the  euro  are  robust  even  after  controlling  for  those  political  v ariables,  except  in  the  last 
specification. In general, discretionary fiscal policy is found to be procyclical in the period before 
Maastricht. After Maastricht, the same comments apply as before: the run-up period to the single 
currency was characterized by a procyclical behaviour, but the period after 1999 is characterized 
by a non reaction of discretionary fiscal policy to the cyclical conditions prevailing in the 




                                                 
1 The political-institutional variables of Mierau et al. (2006) are only available until 2003.  
2  The difference between the estimates for the gap before and after Maastricht is statistically significant in all 
regressions.   12 
It was also investigated whether some institutional variables have a direct impact on the 
reaction of discretionary policy to the output gap. Hence, it was included, one at a time, an 
interaction  term  between  the  political-institutional  variables  and  the  output  gap.  Column  (4) 
presents  the  results  including  the  interacted  effective  number  of  parties  in  government.  Its 
coefficient  shows a negative sign, and is statistically significant at the 10% level. It means, that 
coalition governments (and especially if involving more than two parties) show a tendency to 
design more countercyclical fiscal policies. This might be a side-effect of the negotiations of 
coalition agreements, which restrain the liberty of a given party to manipulate the deficit on his 
behalf. Next, it was included the interacted number of spending ministers. The coefficient is 
positive, small, and statistically significant at the 10% level.
3 The result indicates that the larger 
the government is, the more likely it is to pursue a procyclical discretionary fiscal policy. 
 
                                                 
3 The inclusion of such interaction term renders the output gap before Maastricht non-statistically significant. At the 
10% significant level, discretionary fiscal policy is found to be countercyclical after Maastricht.    13 
Table  3-  Determinants  of  Cyclically  Adjusted Primary  Deficit  (%Potential 
GDP)-1980-2003 
  Euro Area 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 


















GAP92-95  -  -  -0.165 
(-2.03) 
-  - 
GAP96-98  -  -  0.372 
(1.99) 
-  - 
GAP99-2003  -  -  0.025 
(0.24) 
-  - 
































GAP*NSM  -  -  -  -  0.02 
(1.67) 
GAP*ENoP_G  -  -  -  -0.083 
(-1.81) 
 




















P-value BM-AM  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.0)  (0.01)  (0.015) 
P-value BM-A€  -  -  (0.083)  -  - 






























Notes: In parentheses T-stats for coefficients and p-values for tests. The estimation method is Least 
Squared Dummy Variables (LSDV). P-value BM-AM: p-value for the equality of coefficients before 
and after Maastricht. ). P-value BM-A€: p-value for the equality of coefficients before Maastricht and 
after the introduction of the euro. See text for details. 
 
C.   High and low deficit countries 
Next,  it  is  investigated  whether  there  are  considerable  variations  across  groups  of 
countries and at the country level in the euro area. Firstly, the euro area countries were divided 
into  high-deficit  and  low-deficit  countries.  Countries  were  divided  into  such  two  subgroups 
according to their average cyclically adjusted primary deficit level in the period before the run-up 
to the single currency. Hence, countries which presented an average deficit in the 1980-1995 
period larger than the unweighted euro area average were classified as “high deficit countries”. 
 
Table 4 presents a panel estimate distinguishing both group of countries and the preferred 
subdivision  of  time.  There  is  some  evidence  that  the  high-deficit  countries  make  a  more   14 
procyclical  use  of  discretionary  fiscal  policy  than  low-deficit  countries  do.  For  high-deficit 
countries a procyclical discretionary fiscal policy is found for the period before Maastricht, in the 
run-up period, and after 1999.
4 For low-deficit countries, only in the run-up period to the euro 
(1996-1998) a procyclical discretionary is found, both before Maastrich and after the introduction 
of  the  euro  discretionary  fiscal  policy  is  broadly  acyclical.
5  The  inclusion  of  control  for 
institutional variables (and the consequent loss of three years of data) does not affect the se 
conclusions. 
 
Next, the same fiscal reaction equation is estimated at the country level in the eleven euro 
area countries considered. The results are shown in  Table 7 of the appendix. There a limited 
amount of variation in the cyclical properties of discretionary fiscal policy across countries. A 
majority of countries before Maastricht presented procyclical discretionary fiscal policies (all of 
them presented a positive coefficient on the output gap). After the introduction of the euro, in the 
1999-2006 period, all but two countries presented acyclical discretionary fiscal policies. The 
exceptions  are  Greece  and  Spain  that  present  a  procyclical  stance.
6  Moreover, in the nine 
countries with an acyclical fiscal policy, five present a negative gap co efficient, and the other 
four a positive one. A statistically significant negative coefficient signals a  countercyclical 
discretionary fiscal policy. However, due to the general non statistical significance of the output 
gap coefficient in the period after 1999, only for Italy the hypothesis of an equal coefficient for 
the period before Maastricht and after the euro is formally rejected by the data. 
                                                 
4 When controlling for institutional variables, discretionary fiscal policy after the introduction of the euro is found to 
be acyclical in high-deficit countries, since the positive coefficient on the gap is not statistically significant.  
5 Moreover, there is a change in sign in the non -statistically significant coefficient on the output gap. While it is 
positive in the period before Maastrich, it is negative in the period after the introduction of the euro. 
6 The regression for Portugal presents a low fit to the data.   15 
Table  4-  Determinants  of  Cyclically  Adjusted  Primary  Deficit  (%Potential  GDP)  –
Panel for euro area countries: high and low deficit countries- 1980-2006 
  Deficit level  1980-2006  1980-2003 
































Elections    -  0.684 
(3.96) 
ENoP_G    -  -0.093 
(-0.58) 
Surplus seats    -  -0.713 
(-0.78) 
NSM    -  0.142 
(2.1) 








P-value equal coeff.  High  (0.0)  (0.02) 
  Low  (0.0)  (0.0) 
P-value  equal  coeff. 
BM/A€ 
High  (0.0)  (0.097) 
  Low  (0.15)  (0.0) 












Notes: In parentheses T-stats for coefficients and p-values for tests. The estimation method is Least 
Squared Dummy Variables (LSDV). See text for details. 
 
D.  Use of real time data 
In  the  previous  sections,  in  order  to  assess  the  actual  degree  of  countercyclicality  of 
discretionary fiscal policy, ex-post data on the output gap has been used. There is however a 
caveat in the use of real time data: when designing future fiscal policy decisions policy-makers 
do not have such data available, and have to resort to (ex-ante) real-time output gap estimates. 
Such estimates may differ, and usually do differ, from actual (ex-post) gap estimates, which use 
more information than that available at the time of the decision (see Orphanides and van Norden 
(2002)).   16 
A practical limitation to the use of real-time data is that international organizations have 
started to produce comparable estimates of output gaps only relatively recently in the late 1990s. 
This makes it impossible to estimate fiscal rules comparing the period before Maastricht with the 
period  after  Maastricht  using  real-time  data.  Notwithstanding,  in  a  leading  paper  Forni  and 
Momigliano (2004) estimated a fiscal rule using real time data on the output gap as calculated by 
the  OECD  for  the  period  1993-2003.  Differently  from  Galí  and  Perotti  (2003)  the  authors 
distinguished the fiscal policy reaction in favourable cyclical conditions from the fiscal reaction 
during adverse cyclical conditions. They found a countercyclical reaction of discretionary fiscal 
policy to adverse economic conditions and  again a negative (but not statistically significant) 
reaction of the deficit to the output gap during favourable economic conditions. These results 
contrast with the authors’ estimates using ex-post data, when the estimated reaction of fiscal 
policy to adverse cyclical conditions was weaker and not statistically significant. 
 
I have collected the output gap estimates for year t made by the European Commission in 
the spring and autumn of the previous yeat (t-1). The data starts only in 1999. I have then used 
this real-time estimate on the output gap together with the rest of the previously used (ex-post) 
data.
7  The LSDV results are in  Table  5.  As  the  majority  of  national  budgets  in  Europe  are 
submitted to the respective national Parliaments in September/October and the autumn forecast is 
only made public in November, the most relevant forecast is in my opinion the Spring forecast, 
since is the only (Commission’s) forecast available at the time the budget decisions are being 
made by the national governments. Due to the short time dimension of this real-time data it is not 
possible to distinguish positive from negative output gaps, and historically high-deficit countries 
from low-deficit countries. 
 
The results  point to  a positive, and statistically significant,  coefficient  on the (ex-ante) 
output gap variable. This signals that discretionary fiscal policy has been designed since 1999 to 
be procyclical. This result contrasts with the previous results using ex-post data and with the 
results obtained by Forni and Momigliano (2004). As seen before, using ex-post data the euro 
period (1999-2006) was characterised by an acyclical discretionary fiscal policy (due to a small 
positive but non-statistically significant coefficient on the gap variable). In contrast, using ex-
ante data, the coefficient on the output gap is much larger in size (0.336 using the spring forecast) 
and  statistically  significant.  This  indicates  that  the  discretionary  fiscal  policy  that  has  been 
designed ex-ante to be procyclical, has in fact not reacted to the cycle (being acyclical) due to the 
errors in the output gap forecast. As shown in Figure 1, the forecasts for the output gap of year t 
made in the spring of t-1 since 1999 were less favourable (more negative) than the actual ex-post 
output gaps, resulting into mainly positive deviations vis-à-vis the spring forecast made in the 
previous year. This is mainly the result of an overestimation of the growth potential of economies 
in the early 2000s, probably still the result of the dot.com bubble which suggested better future 
                                                 
7 For instance, the measure of the output gap for 2001 used in the regression was the forecast of the output gap made 
by the Commission services in the Spring (or Autumn) of 2000.   17 
prospects.
8 As a result, the evolution of the economy in the beginning of the 2000s appeared to 
be less favourable than it was in reality, leading to the estimation of an output gap more negative 
than the ex-post gaps.
9 
 
This result obtained with real-time data casts some doubts on the conclusions derived from 
evidence from the previous sections, since the actual acyclical behaviour of discretionary fiscal 
policy in the  period 1999-2006 seems to be simply the result of errors in the forecast of the 
output gap, and not the result of a change in the intentions of policy makers. According to this 
section’s results, there is no evidence in favour of the view that Maastricht rules have forced 
policy-makers to change their behaviour and design countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy. 
 
Table  5-  Determinants  of  Cyclically  Adjusted  Primary  Deficit  (%Potential  GDP)  –
Panel for euro area countries using real-time data- 1999-2006 
  Forecast made in: 
  Springt-1  Autumn t-1 
























Notes: In parentheses T-stats for coefficients and p-values for tests. The estimation method is Least 
Squared Dummy Variables (LSDV) using robust standard errors.  See text for details. 
 
 
                                                 
8 For example, for France the output gap in 2000 was forecasted in 1999 on the “Broad Economic Policy Guidelines” 
to be -2.3%. The ex-post data, as available in the spring of 2007 forecast, point to a positive output gap of 2.4%, i.e. 
to a deviation of 4.7% of the potential GDP. For Germany, the numbers are similar (the initial forecast was -0.7 and 
the ex-post value is 1.3%). For Italy, the numbers for 2000 are -3.1 (ex-ante) vs. 1.8% (ex-post), and for Spain -3.1 
vs. 2.2%. 
9 According to Jonung and Larch (2006) an even larger degree of optimism in the medium -term growth outlook is 
present in national official government’s growth projections of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kindom. Such 
optimism  has  resulted  into  cyclical  conditions  that  turn  out  systematically  better  than  assumed  at  the  time  of 
presenting the budget deficit.   18 
Figure 1- Output gap forecasts 1999-2006 




Real time estimation: spring t-1





25 Real time estimation: autumn t-1












Notes: The first three graphs represent the distribution of the output gap estimate for euro-area countries (made in springt-1; 
autumnt-1; ex-post estimate). The last graph represents the distribution of the deviation between the ex-post estimate for year t and 
the forecast made in springt-1). 
  
V.   Concluding remarks 
 
Some  have  feared  that  Maastricht  rules  would  force  fiscal  policy  in  euro-area  to  be 
procyclical. Galí and Perotti (2003) were among the first influential papers to find some evidence 
against  such view. Using data  for the period 1980-2003, Galí  and Perotti  (2003) found that 
discretionary budget deficits have actually become more countercyclical in EMU countries after 
the Maastricht Treaty than before. This paper contributes to this literature by  testing for the 
robustness of such conclusions to: i) a different dataset; ii) a different sub-period division; iii) an 
extension of the estimation period to 2006, i.e. including three more years of EMU; iv) to control 
for the effects of political-institutional variables on the cyclically adjusted primary deficit; v) and, 
to the use of real-time data for the period after the introduction of the euro. 
 
Overall, this paper finds that the results of Galí and Perotti (2003) are broadly robust to the 
first four mentioned changes using ex-post data, but not to the use of real-time data. Using a 
panel data approach for EU-15 countries, and ex-post data, it is found that discretionary fiscal 
policy is procyclical before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. After 1992, it becomes 
acyclical. However, there is considerable variation in the after-Maastricht period. Immediately 
after the signing of the Treaty (1992-1995) discretionary fiscal policy became countercyclical. 
However, in the three years after the decision regarding the start of stage III of EMU is taken in 
December 1995, i.e. in the run-up to the single currency period (1996-1998), discretionary fiscal 
policy becomes again strongly procyclical. Once the euro becomes a reality in 1999, it appears 
that discretionary fiscal policy has been acyclical in the euro-area countries (and also in EU-15). 
Yet, there is some degree of variation at the country level. Distinguishing high-deficit from low-  19 
deficit countries, there is some evidence in favour of the view that low-deficit countries tend to 
pursue more countercyclical discretionary fiscal policies. 
 
Controlling for the influence of political-institutional variables does not change the overall 
conclusion  regarding  the  cyclical  properties  of  discretionary  fiscal  policy.  The  realization  of 
elections is found to have a positive impact on the cyclically adjusted primary deficit (CAPD). 
The  CAPD  increases  also  with  the  number  of  spending  ministers  in  the  government. 
Interestingly,  it  was  found  that  coalition  governments  tend  to  pursue  more  countercyclical 
discretionary fiscal policy. On the reverse, a large number of spending ministers might lead to 
procyclical fiscal decisions. 
 
These first four robustness checks were based on the use of instrumental variables to proxy 
for the expected output gap in the fiscal rule, estimated using ex-post data. However, in practice 
policy-makers have to resort to real-time estimation of the output gaps when deciding fiscal 
policy. Hence, it is important to check the robustness of previous results to the use of real time 
data. A practical difficulty is the length of real-time data: the European Commission forecasts for 
the output gap have only started to be regularly published since 1999. Hence, it is not possible to 
assess the impact of the SGP using real-time data. Notwithstanding, it is possible to estimate the 
fiscal reaction function since 1999. Using such data, an interesting conclusion emerges: in the 
euro-area, discretionary fiscal policy in the period after the introduction of the euro has been 
designed (using the information available at the time) to be procyclical. However, the economic 
conditions have been in general more favourable than initially estimated leading to forecasting 
errors  in  the  output  gap  estimates,  making  actual  discretionary  fiscal  policy  acyclical  in  the 
period 1999-2006, when evaluated using ex-post data. This conclusion contrasts with the results 
of Forni and Momigliano (2004). 
 
All in all, there is some evidence, using ex-post data, pointing to a more countercyclical use 
of discretionary fiscal policy (or at least to a decrease in the use of procyclical discretionary fiscal 
policy),  but  there  is  not  (yet)  definitive  evidence  that  SGP  rules  have  made  fiscal  policy 
countercyclical over the cycle, at least for all euro-area countries. However, the use of real-time 
data for the period 1999-2006 reveals that discretionary fiscal policy has been designed to be 
procyclical. Hence, the actual acyclical behaviour of discretionary fiscal policy in the period after 
1999 seems to be simply the result of errors in the forecast of the output gap, and not the result of 
a change in the intentions of policy makers. As a result there is no evidence in favour of the view 
that Maastricht rules have forced euro-area policy-makers to change their behaviour and design 
countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 6- Determinants of Cyclically Adjusted Primary Deficit (%Potential GDP)-1980-
2003 – Arelllano & Bond estimation method- euro-area 
  (1)*  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 


















-  -0.044 
(-0.45) 




GAP92-95  -  -  -0.145 
(-1.23) 
-  -0.163 
(-1.41) 
-  - 
GAP96-98  -  -  0.395 
(3.78) 
-  0.365 
(2.95) 
-  - 
GAP99-2003  -  -  0.023 
(0.32) 
-  0.04 
(0.81) 
-  - 
































GAP*NSM        -  -  0.019 
(1.37) 
- 
GAP*ENoP_G  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.793 
(-1.01) 




























P-value equal coeff.  (0.01)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.001)  (0.0) 










































Notes: In parentheses T-stats for coefficients and p-values for tests. The estimation method is GMM with lags 2 to 10 of the dependent 
variable. 1
st step estimation in PCGIVE including a constant term (omitted) and individual dummies, using robust standard errors. 
Autocorrelation tests in the first-differenced residuals. The AR1 test is asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of  no first 
order serial correlation. Idem for AR2.  Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions under the null of the validity of instruments.  A 
countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy implies a negative GAP coefficient. *Column (1) presents our previous results using LSDM.    22 
 
Table 7- Determinants of Cyclically Adjusted Primary Deficit (%Potential GDP) in 
euro area –country level results: 1980-2006 





































  0.764  0.502  0.319 








  0.146  0.283  0.328 








  0.098  0.711  0.194 








  0.099  0.016  0.089 







































  0.0  0.151  0.123 








  0.069  0.247  0.773 








  0.0  0.262  0.293 








  0.0  0.204  0.565 








  0.589  0.237  0.316 








  0.06  0.08  0.297 
Notes: Omitted results for lagged deficit and debt. T-values based on robust standard errors. High deficit countries: countries 
that presented an average cyclically adjusted deficit in period 1980-1995 larger than the unweighted euro area average. 
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